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How Did Leading Indicator
Forecasts Perform During
the 2001 Recession?
James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson
T
he recession that began in March 2001 differed in many ways from
other recessions of the past three decades. The twin recessions of the
early 1980s occurred when the Federal Reserve Board, under Chair-
man Paul Volcker, acted decisively to halt the steady rise of inﬂation during
the1970s,despitethesubstantialemploymentandoutputcosttotheeconomy.
Although monetary tightening had reduced the growth rate of real activity in
1989, the proximate cause of the recession of 1990 was a sharp fall in con-
sumption,aresponsebyconsumerstotheuncertaintyraisedbyIraq’sinvasion
of Kuwait and the associated spike in oil prices (Blanchard 1993). In con-
trast, the recession of 2001 started neither in the shopping mall nor in the
corridors of the Federal Reserve Bank, but in the boardrooms of corporate
America as businesses sharply cut back on expenditures—most notably, in-
vestment associated with information technology—in turn leading to declines
in manufacturing output and in the overall stock market.
Because it differed so from its recent predecessors, the recession of 2001
provides a particularly interesting case in which to examine the forecasting
performance of various leading economic indicators. In this article, we take
a look at how a wide range of leading economic indicators performed during
this episode. Did these leading economic indicators predict a slowdown of
growth? Was that slowdown large enough to suggest that a recession was
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imminent? Were the leading indicators that were useful in earlier recessions
also useful in this recession? Why or why not?
We begin our analysis by examining the predictions of professional fore-
casters—speciﬁcally, theforecastersintheSurveyofProfessionalForecasters
(SPF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia—during this
episode. As we show in Section 2, these forecasters were taken by surprise:
even as late as the fourth quarter of 2000, when industrial production was
already declining, the median SPF forecast was predicting strong economic
growth throughout 2001.
Against this sobering backdrop, Section 3 turns to the performance of
individual leading indicators before and during the 2001 recession. Generally
speaking, we ﬁnd that the performance of speciﬁc indicators was different
during this recession. Some indicators, in particular the so-called term spread
(thedifferencebetweenlong-termandshort-terminterestratesongovernment
debt) and stock returns, provided some warning of a slowdown in economic
growth, although the predicted growth was still positive and these indicators
fell short of providing a signal of an upcoming recession. Other, previously
reliableleadingindicators, suchashousingstartsandordersforcapitalgoods,
provided little or no indication of the slowdown.
In practice, individual leading indicators are not used in isolation; as
Mitchell and Burns (1938) emphasized when they developed the system of
leading economic indicators, their signals should be interpreted collectively.
Accordingly, Section 4 looks at the performance of pooled forecasts based
on the individual leading indicator forecasts from Section 3 and ﬁnds some
encouraging results. Section 5 concludes.
1. FORECASTING THE 2001 RECESSION: HOW DID THE
PROS DO?
This section begins with a brief quantitative review of the 2001 recession. We
then turn to professional forecasts during this episode, as measured in real
time by the Philadelphia Fed’s quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters.
A Brief Reprise of the 2001 Recession
Figure 1 presents monthly values of the four coincident indicators that con-
stitute the Conference Board’s Index of Coincident Indicators: employment
in nonagricultural businesses, industrial production, real personal income less
transfers, and real manufacturing and trade sales.1 These four series are also
the primary series that the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee uses to
1 For additional information on the Conference Board’s coincident and leading indexes, see
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Figure 1 Coincident Indicators
establish its business cycle chronology (Hall 2002). The percentage growth
rates of these series, expressed at an annual rate, are plotted in Figure 2. In
addition, Figure 2 presents the percentage growth of real GDP (at an annual
rate); because GDP is measured quarterly and the time scale of Figure 2 is
monthly, in Figure 2 the same growth rate of real GDP is attributed to each
month in the quarter, accounting for the “steps” in this plot.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal that the economic slowdown began with a decline
inindustrialproduction, whichpeakedinJune2000. Manufacturingandtrade
sales fell during the ﬁrst quarter of 2001, but employment did not peak until
March 2001, the ofﬁcial NBER cyclical peak. Real personal income reached
a cyclical peak in November 2000 and declined by 1.5 percent over the next
twelve months. This relatively small decline in personal income reﬂected the
unusual fact that productivity growth remained strong through this recession.
Based on the most recently available data, real GDP fell during the ﬁrst three
quarters of 2001, with a substantial decline of 1.6 percent (at an annual rate)
in the second quarter.
The economy gained substantial strength in the ﬁnal quarter of 2001 and
throughout 2002, and all the monthly indicators were growing by December
2001. Thus, based on the currently available evidence, the recession appears74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




























































































to have ended in the fourth quarter of 2001. When this article went into
production, however, the NBER had yet to announce a cyclical trough, that is,
a formal end to the recession.
Professional Forecasts During 2000 and 2001
In the second month of every quarter, the Research Department of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia surveys a large number of professional
forecasters—in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, thirty-six forecasters or forecasting
groups participated—and asks them a variety of questions concerning their
short-term forecasts for the U.S. economy. Here, we focus on two sets of
forecasts: the forecast of the growth rate of real GDP, by quarter, and theJ. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 75
Table 1 Median Forecasts of the Percentage Growth in Quarterly
GDP from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
Target Date Forecasts Made In
2000 2001
Quarter Actual Growth Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2000Q4 1.1 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2
2001Q1 −0.6 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.3 0.8
2001Q2 −1.6 2.9 2.7 3.2 2.2 1.2
2001Q3 −0.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.0 1.2
2001Q4 2.7 3.2 3.7 2.6 2.8 −1.9
2002Q1 5.0 3.7 3.1 2.7 0.1
2002Q2 1.3 3.6 3.0 2.4
2002Q3 4.0 3.9 3.6
Notes: Entries are quarterly percentage growth rates of real GDP, at an annual rate. One-
quarter-ahead forecasts appear in bold. Actual GDP growth is from the 28 February 2003
GDP release by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Forecasts are the median forecast
from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (various
issues; see www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf).
probability that the forecasters assign to the event that GDP growth will be
negative in an upcoming quarter.
The median growth forecasts—that is, the median of the SPF panel of
forecasts of real GDP growth for a given quarter—are summarized in Table
1 for late 2000Q4 through 2002Q3. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 report
the quarter being forecast and its actual growth rate of real GDP, based on
the most recently available data as of this writing. The remaining columns
report the median SPF growth forecasts; the column date is the quarter in
which the forecast is made for the quarter of the relevant row. For example, as
of 2000Q1, the SPF forecast for 2000Q4 GDP growth was 2.9 percent at an
annual rate (this is the upper-left forecast entry in Table 1). Over the course
of 2000, as the fourth quarter approached, the SPF forecast of 2000Q4 growth
rose slightly; as of 2000Q3, the forecast was 3.2 percent. Because the Bureau
ofEconomicAnalysisdoesnotreleaseGDPestimatesuntilthequarterisover,
forecastersdonotknowGDPgrowthforthecurrentquarter,andinthe2000Q4
survey the average SPF forecast of 2000Q4 real GDP growth was 3.2 percent.
As it happened, the actual growth rate of real GDP during that quarter was
substantially less than forecasted, only 1.1 percent based on the most recently
available data.
An examination of the one-quarter-ahead forecasts (for example, the
2000Q3 forecast of 2000Q4 growth) and the current-quarter forecasts (the
2000Q4 forecast of 2000Q4 growth) reveals that the SPF forecasters failed76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Probabilities of a Quarterly Decline in Real GDP from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters
Target Date Forecasts Made In
2000 2001
Quarter Actual Growth Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2000Q4 1.1 13% 9% 7% 4%
2001Q1 −0.6 17 15 13 11 37%
2001Q2 −1.6 18 16 17 32 32%
2001Q3 −0.3 17 19 23 29 35%
2001Q4 2.7 19 18 23 26 82%
2002Q1 5.0 13 18 20 49
2002Q2 1.3 13 16 27
2002Q3 4.0 15 18
Notes: Forecast entries are the probability that real GDP growth will be negative, aver-
aged across SPF forecasters. The forecasted probability that growth will be negative in
the quarter after the forecast is made (that is, the one-quarter-ahead forecast) appears in
bold. See the notes to Table 1.
to predict the sharp declines in real GDP, even as they were occurring. The
SPF one-quarter-ahead forecast of 2001Q1 growth was 3.3 percent, whereas
GDP actually fell by 0.6 percent; the one-quarter-ahead forecast of 2001Q2
growth was 2.2 percent, but GDP fell by 1.6 percent; and the one-quarter-
ahead forecast of 2001Q3 growth was 2.0 percent, while GDP fell by 0.3
percent. Throughout this episode, this average forecast was substantially too
optimistic about near-term economic growth. Only in the fourth quarter of
2001 did the forecasters begin to forecast ongoing weakness—in part in reac-
tion to the events of September 11—but, as it happened, in that quarter GDP
was already recovering.
The SPF forecasters are also asked the probability that real GDP will
fall, by quarter, and Table 2 reports the average of these probabilities across
the SPF forecasters. In the fourth quarter of 2000, the forecasters saw only
an 11 percent chance that GDP growth in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 would be
negative,consistentwiththeiroptimisticgrowthforecastof3.3percentforthat
quarter; infact, GDPgrowthwasnegative, fallingby0.6percent. Throughout
the ﬁrst three quarters of 2001, the current-quarter predicted probabilities of
negative growth hovered around one-third, even though growth was in fact
negative in each of those quarters. When, in the fourth quarter of 2001, the
SPF forecasters ﬁnally were sure that growth would be negative—the SPF
probability of negative same-quarter growth was 82 percent—the economy in
fact grew by a strong 2.7 percent. Evidently, this recession was a challenging
time for professional forecasters.J. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 77
Table 3 Relative MSFEs of Individual Indicator Forecasts of U.S.
Output Growth, 1999Q1–2002Q3
Predictor Transformation GDP IP
h = 2 h = 4 h = 2 h = 4
Root Mean Squared Forecast Error
Univariate autoregression 2.06 2.03 4.34 4.92
Predictor MSFE Rel. to Univariate AR Model
Random walk level 1.26 1.11 1.56 1.17
Interest Rates
Federal funds   1.01 0.71 0.97 0.78
90-day T-bill   1.01 0.76 1.02 0.88
1-year T-bond   1.17 0.96 1.22 1.06
5-year T-bond   1.37 1.24 1.38 1.23
10-year T-bond   1.36 1.26 1.21 1.23
Spreads
Term spread
(10 year–federal funds)* level 0.86 0.65 0.77 0.72
Term spread
(10 year–90-day T-bill) level 0.87 0.62 0.70 0.62
Paper-bill spread
(commercial paper–T-bill) level 1.31 1.17 1.96 1.43
Junk bond spread
(high yield–AAA corporate) level 0.76 0.65 0.67 0.58
Other Financial Variables
Exchange rate  ln 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.80
Stock prices*  ln 0.83 0.93 0.64 0.71
Output
Real GDP  ln 0.92 0.96
IP–total  ln 0.98 1.01
IP–products  ln 1.03 0.99 1.03 0.96
IP–business equipment  ln 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.06
IP–intermediate products  ln 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88
IP–materials  ln 0.97 1.01 1.04 0.98
Capacity utilization rate level 0.91 1.01 0.85 1.03
Labor Market
Employment  ln 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.99
Unemployment rate   1.24 1.08 1.31 1.09
Average weekly hours
in manufacturing* level 0.87 0.75 0.72 0.87
New claims for
unemployment insurance*  ln 0.75 0.84 0.74 0.81
Continued on next page
2. FORECASTS BASED ON INDIVIDUAL LEADING
INDICATORS
Perhaps one reason for these difﬁculties was that the 2001 recession differed
from its recent predecessors. If so, this difference would also be reﬂected78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 3 Relative MSFEs of Individual Indicator Forecasts of U.S.
Output Growth, 1999Q1–2002Q3
Other Leading Indicators
Housing starts (building permits)*  ln 1.30 1.07 1.52 1.14
Vendor performance* level 1.02 0.97 1.19 0.97
Orders–consumer
goods and materials*  ln 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.83
Orders–nondefense
capital goods*  ln 1.02 1.03 0.92 1.09
Consumer expectations
(Michigan)* level 1.96 2.14 1.33 1.49
Prices and Wages
GDP deﬂator  2 ln 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.84
PCE deﬂator  2 ln 1.01 1.05 0.99 0.99
PPI  2 ln 1.01 1.02 0.96 0.99
Earnings  2 ln 1.00 1.01 0.89 0.98
Real oil price  2 ln 1.13 1.18 1.07 1.11
Real commodity price  2 ln 1.04 1.00 1.12 1.09
Money
Real M0  ln 2.13 2.84 1.41 1.73
Real M1  ln 1.09 1.07 1.57 1.12
Real M2*  ln 2.06 1.82 2.13 1.94
Real M3  ln 1.81 2.23 2.05 2.15
Notes: The entry in the ﬁrst line is the root MSFE of the AR forecast, in percentage
growth rates at an annual rate. The remaining entries are the MSFE of the forecast
based on the individual indicator, relative to the MSFE of the benchmark AR forecast.
The ﬁrst forecast is made using data through 1999Q1; the ﬁnal forecast period ends at
2000Q3. The second column provides the transformation applied to the leading indicator
to make the forecast, for example, for the federal funds rate forecasts, Xt in (1) is the
ﬁrst difference of the federal funds rate.
*Included in the Conference Board’s Index of Leading Indicators.
in the performance of leading indicators over this episode. In this section,
we examine the performance of forecasts based on individual leading indica-
tors during the 2001 recession. We begin by discussing the methods used to
construct these forecasts, then turn to graphical and quantitative analyses of
the forecasts.
Construction of Leading Indicator Forecasts
The leading indicator forecasts were computed by regressing future output
growth over two or four quarters against current and past values of output
growth and the candidate leading indicator. Speciﬁcally, let Yt =  lnQt,
where Qt is the level of output (either the level of real GDP or the Index
of Industrial Production), and let Xt be a candidate predictor (e.g., the termJ. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 79
spread). Let Y h
t+h denote output growth over the next h quarters, expressed
at an annual rate; that is, let Y h
t+h = (400/h)ln(Qt+h/Qt). The forecasts of
Y h
t+h are made using the h-step-ahead regression model,
Y h






γ iYt−i + uh
t+h, (1)
where uh
t+h is an error term and α, β0,...,βp−1, γ 0,...,γ q−1 are unknown
regression coefﬁcients. Forecasts are computed for two- and four-quarter
horizons (h = 2 and h = 4).
To simulate real-time forecasting, the coefﬁcients of equation (1) were
estimatedusingonlydatapriortotheforecastdate. Forexample,foraforecast
madeusingdatathroughthefourthquarterof2000,weestimate(1)usingonly
data available through the fourth quarter of 2000. Moreover, the number of
lags of X and Y included in (1), that is, p and q, were also estimated using
only data available through the date of the forecast; speciﬁcally, p and q
were selected using theAkaike Information Criterion (AIC), with 1 ≤ p ≤ 4
and 0 ≤ q ≤ 4.2 Restricting the estimation to data available through the
forecast date—in this example, 2000Q4—prevents the forecasts from being
misleadingly accurate by using future data and also helps to identify shifts in
theforecastingrelationduringtheperiodthatmattersforforecasting,theendof
thesample. Thisapproach,inwhichallestimationandmodelselectionisdone
using only data prior to the forecast date, is commonly called “pseudo out-of-
sample forecasting”; for an introduction to pseudo out-of-sample forecasting
methods and examples, see Stock and Watson (2003b, Section 12.7).
As a benchmark, we computed a multistep autoregressive (AR) forecast,
inwhich(1)isestimatedwithnoXt predictorandthelaglengthischosenusing
the AIC (0 ≤ q ≤ 4). As an additional benchmark, we computed a recursive
random walk forecast, in which ˆ Y h
t+h|t = hˆ µt, where ˆ µt is the sample average
of Ys, s = 1,...,t. Like the leading indicator forecasts, these benchmark
forecasts were computed following the pseudo out-of-sample methodology.3
2 The AIC is AIC(p,q) = ln(SSRp,q /T)+ 2(p + q + 1)/T, where SSRp,q is the sum of
squared residuals from the estimation of (1) with lag lengths p and q, and T is the number of
observations. The lag lengths p and q are chosen to minimize AIC(p,q) by trading off better ﬁt
(the ﬁrst term) against a penalty for including more lags (the second term). For further explanation
and a worked example, see Stock and Watson (2003b, Section 12.5).
3 One way that this methodology does not simulate real-time forecasting is that we use the
most recently available data to make the forecasts, rather than the data that were actually available
in real time. For many of the leading indicators, such as interest rates and consumer expectations,
the data are not revised, so this is not an issue. For others, such as GDP, revisions can be large,
and because our simulated real-time forecasts use GDP growth as a predictor in equation (1), their
performance in this exercise could appear better than it might have in real time, when preliminary
values of GDP would be used.80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
A Look at Twelve Leading Indicators
We begin the empirical analysis by looking at the historical paths of twelve
commonly used monthly leading indicators. After describing the twelve indi-
cators, we see how they fared during the 2001 recession.
The Twelve Leading Indicators
Six of these indicators are based on interest rates or prices: a measure of the
term spread (the ten-year Treasury bond rate minus the federal funds rate);
the federal funds rate; the paper-bill spread (the three-month commercial pa-
per rate minus the Treasury bill rate); the high-yield “junk” bond spread (the
difference between the yield on high-yield securities4 and theAAA corporate
bond yield); the return on the S&P 500; and the real price of oil. Research
in the late 1980s (Stock and Watson 1989; Harvey 1988, 1989; Estrella and
Hardouvelis 1991) provided formal empirical evidence supporting the idea
that an inverted yield curve signals a recession, and the term spread is now
one of the seven indicators in the Conference Board’s Index of Leading In-
dicators (ILI). The federal funds rate is included because it is the instrument
of monetary policy. Public-private spreads also have been potent indicators
in past recessions (Stock and Watson 1989; Friedman and Kuttner 1992); the
second of these, the junk bond spread, was proposed by Gertler and Lown
(2000) as an alternative to the paper-bill spread, which failed to move before
the 1991 recession. Stock returns have been a key ﬁnancial leading indicator
since they were identiﬁed as such by Mitchell and Burns (1938), and the S&P
500 return is included in ILI.5 Finally, ﬂuctuations in oil prices are widely
considered to be a potentially important source of external economic shocks
and have been associated with past recessions (e.g., Hamilton 1983).
The next ﬁve indicators measure different aspects of the real economy.
ThreeoftheseareintheILI:newclaimsforunemploymentinsurance;housing
starts (building permits); and the University of Michigan Index of Consumer
Expectations. Because corporate investment played a central role in the 2001
recession,wealsolookattwobroadmonthlymeasuresofbusinessinvestment:
industrial production of business equipment and new orders for capital goods.
Finally, weconsideratraditionalleadingindicator, thegrowthrateofrealM2,
which also enters the ILI.
4 Merrill Lynch, U.S. High Yield Master II Index.
5 For a review of the extensive literature over the past ﬁfteen years on the historical and
international performance of asset prices as leading indicators, see Stock and Watson (2001).J. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 81
Figure 3 Twelve Leading Indicators from 1986 to 2002, Two-Quarter
Growth in Real GDP, and Its Leading-Indicator-Based
Forecast
Graphical Analysis
Figure 3 plots the time path of these twelve leading indicators from 1986Q1
through 2002Q3, along with actual two-quarter real GDP growth and its fore-
cast based on that indicator. For each series in Figure 3, the solid lines are
the actual two-quarter GDP growth (thick line) and its indicator-based fore-
cast (thin line); the dates correspond to the date of the forecast (so the value
plotted for the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 is the forecasted and actual growth of GDP
over the second and third quarters, at an annual rate). The dashed line is the
historical values of the indicator itself (the value of the indicator plotted in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2001 is its actual value at that date). The scale for the solid
lines is given on the right axis and the scale for the dashed line is given on the
left axis.82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Twelve Leading Indicators from 1986 to 2002, Two-Quarter
Growth in Real GDP, and Its Leading-Indicator-Based
Forecast
Inspection of Figure 3 reveals that some of these indicators moved in
advance of the economic contraction, but others did not. The term spread
provided a clear signal that the economy was slowing: the long government
rate was less than the federal funds rate from June 2000 through March 2001.
The decline in the stock market through the second half of 2000 also presaged
furtherdeclinesintheeconomy. Newclaimsforunemploymentinsurancerose
sharply over 2000, signaling a slowdown in economic activity. In contrast,
other indicators, particularly series related to consumer spending, were strong
throughout the ﬁrst quarters of the recession. Housing starts fell sharply
during the 1990 recession but remained strong through 2000. The consumer
expectation series remained above 100 throughout 2000, reﬂecting overall
positive consumer expectations. Although new capital goods orders droppedJ. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 83
Figure 3 Twelve Leading Indicators from 1986 to 2002, Two-Quarter























































































































Notes: The solid lines are actual two-quarter GDP growth (thick line) and its indicator-
based forecast (thin line), aligned so that the plotted date is the date of the forecast. The
dashed line is the historical values of the indicator itself. The scale for the solid lines
is given on the right axis and the scale for the dashed line is given on the left axis.
offsharply, thatdeclinewascontemporaneouswiththedeclineinGDP,andin
this sense new capital goods orders did not forecast the onset of the recession.
The paper-bill spread provided no signal of the recession: although it moved
upbrieﬂyinOctober1998,October1999,andJune2000,thespreadwassmall
and declining fromAugust 2000 through the end of 2001, and the forecast of
output growth based on the paper-bill spread remained steady and strong. In
contrast, the junk bond spread rose sharply in 1998, leveled off, then rose84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
again in 2000. The junk bond spread correctly predicted a substantial slowing
in the growth rate of output during 2001; however, it incorrectly predicted a
slowdown during 1998. Finally, real M2 performed particularly poorly; the
strong growth of the money supply before and during this recession led to
M2-based output forecasts that were far too optimistic.
QuantitativeAnalysis of Forecast Errors
The graphical analysis shows that many of these indicators produced overly
optimistic forecasts, which in turn led to large forecast errors. However, some
indicators performed better than others. To assess forecast performance more
precisely, we examine the mean squared forecast error over this episode of
the different indicators relative to a benchmark autoregressive forecast. The
mean squared forecast error is the most common way, but not the only way, to
quantify forecasting performance, and we conclude this section with a brief
discussion of the results if other approaches are used instead.
Relative Mean Squared Forecast Error
The relative mean squared forecast error (MSFE) compares the performance
of a candidate forecast (forecast i) to a benchmark forecast; both forecasts




through time t, based on the ith individual indicator. Let ˆ Y h
0,t+h|t denote the
corresponding benchmark forecast made using the autoregression. Then the












t+h − ˆ Y h
0,t+h|t)2
,( 2 )
where T1 and T2 − h are, respectively, the ﬁrst and last dates over which the
pseudo out-of-sample forecast is computed. For this analysis, we set T1 to
1999Q1 and T2 to 2002Q3. If the relative MSFE of the candidate forecast is
less than one, then the forecast based on that leading indicator outperformed
theAR benchmark in the period just before and during the 2001 recession.
Inprinciple, itwouldbedesirabletoreportastandarderrorfortherelative
MSFE in addition to the relative MSFE itself. If the benchmark model is not
nested in (that is, is not a special case of) the candidate model, then the
standard error can be computed using the methods in West (1996). Clark and
McCracken (2001) show how to test the hypothesis that the candidate model
provides no improvement in the more complicated case that the candidate
model nests the benchmark model. Unfortunately, neither situation appliesJ. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 85
Table 4 Relative MSFEs of Combination Forecasts, 1999Q1–2002Q3
Combination Forecast Method GDP IP
h = 2 h = 4 h = 2 h = 4
Based on All Indicators
Mean 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95
Median 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.95
Inverse MSFE weights 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96
Excluding Money
Mean 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.92
Median 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.94
Inverse MSFE weights 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.94
Notes: Entries are the relative MSFEs of combination forecasts constructed using the full
set of leading indicator forecasts in Table 3 (ﬁrst three rows) and using the subset that
excludes monetary aggregates (ﬁnal three rows).
here because the lag length is chosen every quarter using the AIC; in some
quarters the candidate model nests the benchmark, but in other quarters it
does not. Because methods for this mixed case have yet to be worked out, the
empirical results below report relative MSFEs but not standard errors.
Empirical Results
The relative MSFEs for thirty-seven leading indicators (including the twelve
in Figure 3) are presented in the ﬁnal four columns of Table 3 for two- and
four-quarter-ahead forecasts of GDP growth and IP growth; the indicator and
its transformation appear in the ﬁrst two columns.
The mixed forecasting picture observed in Figure 3 is reﬂected in the
MSFEs in Table 3. The relative MSFEs show that some predictors—the
term spread, short-term interest rates, the junk bond spread, stock prices,
andnewclaimsforunemploymentinsurance—producedsubstantialimprove-
ments over the benchmarkAR forecast. For example, the mean squared fore-
casterrorofthefour-quarter-aheadforecastofGDPbasedoneithermeasureof
the term spread was one-third less than theAR benchmark. The two-quarter-
ahead forecast of real GDP growth based on unemployment insurance claims
had an MSFE 75 percent of theAR benchmark, another striking success.
In contrast, forecasts based on consumer expectations, housing starts,
long-term interest rates, oil prices, or the growth of monetary aggregates all
performed worse—in some cases, much worse—than the benchmark autore-
gression. Overall, the results from Table 3 reinforce the graphical analysis
basedonFigure3andprovideanimpressionofinconsistencyacrossindicators
and, for a given indicator, inconsistency over time (e.g., the differing behavior
of housing starts during the 1990 and 2001 recessions). This instability of86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
forecasts based on individual leading indicators is consistent with other re-
centeconometricevidenceontheinstabilityofforecastrelationsintheUnited
States and other developed economies; see, for example, the review of fore-
casts with asset prices in Stock and Watson (2001).
Results for Other Loss Functions
Themeansquaredforecasterrorisbasedonthemostcommonlyusedforecast
loss function, quadratic loss. Quadratic loss implies a particular concern
about large mistakes (a forecast error twice as large is treated as four times
as “costly”). Although the theoretical literature abounds with other forecast
loss functions, after quadratic loss the next most frequently used loss function
in practice is mean absolute error loss, which in turn leads to considering the
relative mean absolute forecast error (MAFE). The MAFE is deﬁned in the
samewayastheMSFEinequation(2), exceptthatthetermsinthesummation
appear in absolute values rather than squared. The MAFE imposes less of a
penalty for large forecast errors than does the MSFE.
We recomputed the results in Table 3 using the relative MAFE instead
of the relative MSFE (to save space, the results are not tabulated here). The
qualitative conclusions based on the relative MAFE are similar to those based
on the relative MSFE. In particular, the predictors that improved substantially
upon the AR as measured by the MSFE, such as the term spread and new
claims for unemployment insurance, also did so as measured by the MAFE;
similarly, those that fared substantially worse than the AR under the relative
MSFE, such as consumer expectations and housing starts, also did so using
the MAFE.
This analysis has focused on forecasts of growth rates. A different tack
would be to consider forecasts of whether the economy will be in a recession,
that is, predicted probabilities that the economy will be in a recession in the
near future. This focus on recessions and expansions can be interpreted as
adopting a different loss function, one in which the most important thing is to
forecast the decree of the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. Because
this episode has had only one turning point so far, the peak of March 2001, we
thinkthatmoreinformationaboutleadingindicatorforecastsduringthisperiod
canbegleanedbystudyingquarterlygrowthrateforecaststhanbyfocusingon
binary recession event forecasts. Still, an analysis of recession event forecasts
iscomplementarytoouranalysis,andrecentlyFilardo(2002)lookedatseveral
probabilistic recession forecasting models. One of his ﬁndings is that the
results of these models depend on whether ﬁnal revisions or real-time data
are used (the forecasts based on ﬁnally revised data are better). He also ﬁnds
that a probit model based on the term spread, the paper-bill spread, and stock
returns provided advance warning of the 2001 recession, a result consistent
with the relatively good performance of the term spread and stock returns in
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3. COMBINATION FORECASTS
The SPF forecasts examined in Tables 1 and 2 are the average of the forecasts
by the individual survey respondents. Such pooling of forecasts aggregates
the different information and models used by participating forecasters, and
studies show that pooled, or combination, forecasts regularly improve upon
the constituent individual forecasts (see Clemen 1989; Diebold and Lopez
1996; and Newbold and Harvey 2002). Indeed, in their original work on
leading indicators, Mitchell and Burns (1938) emphasized the importance of
looking at many indicators, because each provides a different perspective on
current and future economic activity.
In this section, we pursue this line of reasoning and examine the per-
formance during the 2001 recession of combination forecasts that pool the
forecasts based on the individual leading indicators examined in Section 3.
The literature on forecast combination has proposed many statistical methods
for combining forecasts; two important early contributions to this literature
are Bates and Granger (1969) and Granger and Ramanathan (1984). Here we
considerthreesimplemethodsforcombiningforecasts: themean,themedian,
and an MSFE-weighted average based on recent performance.
The mean combination forecast is the sample average of the forecasts in
the panel. The median modiﬁes this by computing the median of the panel of
forecasts instead of the mean, which has the potential advantage of reducing
theinﬂuenceof“crazy”forecasts,oroutliers. Thisisthemethodthatwasused
to produce the SPF combination forecasts in Table 1. The MSFE-weighted
average forecast gives more weight to those forecasts that have been perform-
ing well in the recent past. Here we implement this combination forecast
by computing the forecast error for each of the constituent forecasts over the
period from 1982Q1 through the date that the forecast is made (thereby fol-
lowing the pseudo out-of-sample methodology), then estimating the current
mean squared forecast error as the discounted sum of past squared forecast
errors, with a quarterly discount factor of 0.95. The weight received by any
individual forecast in the weighted average is inversely proportional to its dis-
counted mean squared forecast error, so the leading indicators that have been
performing best most recently receive the greatest weight.
TheresultsaresummarizedinTable4. Thecombinationforecastsprovide
consistentmodestimprovementsovertheARbenchmark. Duringthisepisode,
the simple mean performed better than either the median or inverse MSFE-
weighted combination forecasts.
Because real money has been an unreliable leading indicator of output for
many years in many developed economies (Stock andWatson 2001)—a char-
acteristicthatcontinuedinthe2001recession—itisalsoofinteresttoconsider
combination forecasts that exclude the monetary aggregates. Not surprisingly
giventheresultsinTable3,thecombinationforecastsexcludingmoneyexhibit
better performance than those that include the monetary aggregates.88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Of course, the sample size is small and we should refrain from drawing
strong conclusions from this one case study. Moreover, the improvements
of the combination forecasts over the AR benchmark are less than the im-
provements shown by those individual indicators, such as new claims for
unemployment insurance, that were, in retrospect, most successful during this
episode. Still, the performance of the simple combination forecasts results is
encouraging.
4. DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSIONS
Leo Tolstoy opened Anna Karenina by asserting, “Happy families are all
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” So too, it seems,
with recessions. While the decline of the stock market gave some advance
warning of the 2001 recession, it was not otherwise a reliable indicator during
the 1980s and 1990s. Building permits and consumer conﬁdence, which
declinedsharplyprecedingandduringthe1990recession,maintainedstrength
well into the 2001 recession. While the term spread indicated an economic
slowdown in 2001, it did not give an early signal in the 1990 recession. The
varying performance of these indicators reﬂects the differences in the shocks
and economic conditions prior to the 1990 and 2001 recessions.
In retrospect, the performance of the various individual indicators is gen-
erally consistent with the view that this recession was a joint consequence
of a sharp decline of the stock market (perhaps nudged by some monetary
tightening) and an associated pronounced decline in business investment, es-
pecially in information technology. These shocks affected manufacturing and
production but diffused only slowly to general employment, incomes, and
consumption. But without knowing these shocks in advance, it is unclear how
aforecasterwouldhavedecidedin1999whichofthemanypromisingleading
indicators would perform well over the next few years and which would not.
The failure of individual indicators to perform consistently from one re-
cession to the next, while frustrating, should not be surprising. After all,
the U.S. economy has undergone important changes during the past three
decades, including an expansion of international trade, the development of
ﬁnancial markets and the concomitant relaxing of liquidity constraints facing
consumers, and dramatic increases in the use of information technology in
manufacturing and inventory management. Moreover, the conduct of mone-
tary policy arguably has shifted from being reactionary, using recessions to
quell inﬂation, to more proactive, with the Fed acting as if it is targeting in-
ﬂation (see Goodfriend 2002). As we discuss elsewhere (Stock and Watson
2001, 2003a), these and other macroeconomic changes could change the rela-
tionbetweenﬁnancialleadingindicatorsandeconomicactivityand,tovarying
degrees, could contribute to the reduction in volatility of GDP that the United
States (and other countries) have enjoyed since the mid-1980s.J. H. Stock and M. W. Watson: Leading Indicator Forecasts 89
Our conclusion—that every decline in economic activity declines in its
own way—is not new. Indeed, one of the reasons that Mitchell and Burns
(1938) suggested looking at many indicators was that each measured a dif-
ferent feature of economic activity, which in turn can play different roles in
different recessions. In light of the variable performance of individual in-
dicators and the evident difﬁculty professional forecasters had during this
episode, theresultsforthecombinationforecastsareencouragingandsuggest
that, taken together, leading economic indicators did provide some warning
of the economic difﬁculties of 2001.
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